While Southeast Asian economies have been fast expanding in the last decade, better than most regions, wealth and income inequality—i.e., the gap between the rich and poor—has been equally growing. 

The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN Escap) reports that “Southeast Asia has seen inequalities widen, a setback to overcome” if Goal 10 (reduced inequality within and among countries) of the UN’s 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is to be achieved. 

The Asean Post remarks on the disturbing wealth and income disparities in Southeast Asian societies: 

“The richest 1% in Thailand controls 58% of the country’s wealth and the top 10% earned 35 times more than the bottom 10%. In Indonesia, the four richest men there have more wealth than the poorest 100 million people, and about 50% of the country’s wealth is in the hands of the top 1%. In Vietnam, 210 of the country’s super-rich earn more than enough in a year to lift 3.2 million people out of poverty. The country’s richest man earns more in a day than the poorest person earns in 10 years. 

“In Malaysia, while only 0.6% of its 31 million people are living under the poverty line, 34% of the country’s indigenous people and 7% of children in urban low-cost housing projects live in poverty. In the Philippines, the average annual family income of the top 10% is estimated at US$14,708 in 2015, nine times more than the lowest 10% at US$1,609.”

The World Bank estimates that two Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines (42.3) and Malaysia (41.1), have crossed the borderline index of 40, which is seen as the danger zone for the Gini inequality index (See Table 4). Singapore (39.8), Laos (38.8), and Indonesia (38.2) are dangerously close to the borderline. (Note: The Gini index, or Gini coefficient, ranges from 0, or 0%, to 100, or 100%, with 0 representing perfect equality and 100 representing perfect inequality.) 

The UN Escap reports that Southeast Asia fares badly in all but one of the UN SDGs to be achieved by 2030. It reports that for Goal 1 (ending poverty), progress is hampered by a lack of social spending for health and education and natural disasters. Progress for Goal 2 (zero hunger) is slow, and food insecurity continues to affect 100 million people in the region. Regression is also observed in Goal 7 (sustainable energy), Goal 13 (climate action), Goal 14 (life below water), and Goal 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions).

The Escap further notes stagnation or lack of progress in Goal 11 (sustainable cities and communities), Goal 12 (responsible consumption and production), Goal 15 (life on land), and Goal 17 (partnership for the goals). It is only in Goal 9 (innovation, industry, and infrastructure) that Southeast Asia is on track. The latter index means that corporate and other business interests have been the sole concern of Southeast Asian governments, to the neglect of the rest of society. 

Related: Independent media’s critical role in social transformation

Southeast Asia also lags when it comes to bridging digital divides. While Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore have high rates of internet users (84 to 94%), Laos, Myanmar, and Timor-Leste have less than 30% of their populations having digital access. 

In another report, the UN Social and Economic Council notes that social protection in Southeast Asia is similarly wanting, with 62 to 88% of vulnerable populations deprived of benefits. Of the region’s total population, only 33% is covered by at least one social protection benefit. 

The low proportions of the region’s population covered by social protection systems are:

• Children receiving cash benefits (22.2%). 
• Mothers with newborns receiving maternity cash benefits (28%).
• Older persons with pensions (37.8%).
• Unemployed receiving unemployment cash benefits (12.3%).
• Persons with disabilities collecting disability cash benefits (28%).
• Vulnerable individuals receiving cash assistance (21%). 

Corruption continues to be prevalent in the Asia-Pacific where, “like most of the world, scores have stagnated over the last decade, as noted by Transparency International.”  High levels of corruption contribute to rising uncertainty and exacerbate the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change, and security and economic threats. Politically, corruption bloats the power of authoritarian rulers, adds to the democratic deficit, and marginalizes civil society organizations. 

Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index shows that six of the 10 Southeast Asian countries ranked are in the bottom half of the 180 countries surveyed (Table 5). These are Thailand (101st), Indonesia (110th), the Philippines (116th), Laos (126th), Cambodia (150th), and Myanmar (157th). In terms of scores, however, only Singapore registered an excellent 83 (out of 100) and ranked fifth among all countries even as it dropped two places from 2021. The nine other countries had scores below 50. 

Like many countries in the developing world, most Southeast Asian countries suffer from fragile health care systems. These have been strained heavily by the pandemic, resulting in staff losses due to burnout and depression as well as pandemic-related deaths. Further complicating the health care situation is the accelerated exodus of medical personnel to developed countries. 

The UN World Health Organization noted that “55 countries with some of the world’s fragile health systems do not have enough [health care workers] and many are losing [them] to international migration.” Southeast Asian countries with high levels of health care workers’ out migration include the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and East Timor. 

Southeast Asian governments need to address these social flashpoints if sustainable development is to achieved. A redirection of development strategies is needed—one which addresses issues of social protection and wealth inequalities alongside attention to economic growth. Obviously, the two concerns cannot be separated from each other.

To illustrate, a February 2022 report by the UN Development Program strongly argues that “the highest reductions in inequality have been achieved by countries that invest in universal social security” and imposed “higher levels of taxation from the wealthier members of society, which is then redistributed across the population.”

This article is excerpted, revised and updated from the author’s introduction “Post-pandemic Southeast Asia: Systemic perils and peoples’ alternatives” to Re-Imagining Post-Pandemic Societies: Alternative Practices Across Southeast Asia: Volume II, Monograph Series 2023-03. UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies. Read the full report here: https://cids.up.edu.ph/download/re-imagining-post-pandemic-societies-alternative-practices-across-southeast-asia-volume-2/. —Ed.

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Downplaying the Philippines’ seemingly impressive 2022 growth of 7.6%, economist JC Punongbayan views it from the phenomenon of a “base effect.” This means that “coming from such a low base in 2021” makes an increase for 2022 “register as a sizable growth rate.” The “base effect” effect could very well apply to other Southeast Asian countries, which, except for Vietnam, Myanmar, and Brunei, suffered negative growth in 2020 and only grew at a mediocre level in 2021. Myanmar, however, registered a negative 18% growth for 2021.

But the ADB predicts that such growth rates cannot be sustained for 2023 “as global demand weakens” alongside high inflation due to rising global food and energy prices, rising interest rates, higher capital outflows, currency depreciation, reduced government spending, dollar appreciation, the US-China trade war, and the “collateral damage” on Southeast Asia from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

The Asia Society agrees with the ADB and sees 2023 as a year when Southeast Asian “governments are having to navigate a sharply deteriorating global economic outlook” marked by the cited indicators. These factors dampen economic growth in the region.

Vietnam may already be suffering the expected 2023 downturn. Asia’s fastest growing economy shocked forecasters with a 3.3% 2023 first-quarter growth, belying projections by global rating companies of from 4.5% to 6.1% for the same period. Accordingly, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development forecasts Southeast Asia’s economies to slow down to a 4.6% growth for 2023.

Informal workers

The region’s vulnerabilities are heightened by the predominance of informal workers who comprise about 70% of the labor force with proportions surpassing 80% in Cambodia and Myanmar. Mostly women, informal workers contribute and are crucial to national economies, but are ineligible for mandated benefits; their already bleak situation was intensified during the pandemic as many lost their means of livelihood and could not qualify for social assistance. 

Informal workers are part of a broader category—the precariat class—who are in both informal and formal work and have no security of tenure, earn low wages, lack social protection, and are in dire working conditions. In Southeast Asia, precariat work can be found in low-skilled, labor-intensive industries in agriculture, manufacturing, the service sector, and construction. 

At the other end of the labor spectrum, regular or formal work in 2023 is not free of hazards, either. The Britain-based think tank Oxford Economics forecasts that regular or formal work for all sectors in Southeast Asia would also decline as demand for it peters out due to the global trade downturns.

Being composed mainly of developing economies, Southeast Asia faces a funding gap of “almost US$500 billion in collective debt reserving payments that are due in the next four years,” according to the World Economic Forum. This is attributed to rising interest rates and a stronger US dollar. In 2022, the Philippines and Thailand registered the highest Southeast Asian increase in the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product (GDP). The debt-to-GDP ratio for Southeast Asia grew from 49% in 2019 to 63% in 2021, with Laos clocking 92.4%, Malaysia 63.4%, the Philippines 60.4%, and Thailand 59.7 percent. 

‘Debt trap’

Though not an absolute indicator, the suggested measure of debt sustainability is set at a threshold of 60% of GDP beyond which a debt crisis or a “debt trap” could arise. There are, of course, more meaningful ways of determining the magnitude of the debt burden and its sustainability with respect to loan-financed projects including social and environmental fallouts, “hidden costs,” tied aid, and sovereign guarantees.

The funding gap also infects the region’s most vulnerable business sector—the micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). The sector employs almost 70% of Southeast Asia’s labor force, but 60% of the region’s MSMEs have limited or no access to capital due to “a lack of formal credit history and cumbersome requirements,” a 2021 study by the Tech for Good Institute uncovered. 

Of particular concern is China’s growing exposure in Southeast Asia’s development financing policies that see the region’s debt to the Asian powerhouse increasing. A study by Singapore’s Institute for Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), reports that since China’s development loans in the region are “mainly debt-financed, rather than aid-financed,” interest rates are “substantially higher … than those of benchmark institutions such as the World Bank, and therefore generate higher returns for Chinese lenders.” ISEAS concludes that China’s commercial-driven loans do not fit “Beijing’s self-image as a benevolent development partner.”

One case stands out that vividly illustrates the problems that could arise from China’s lending strategies. The massive 1,035-kilometer China-Laos railway was inaugurated on Dec. 3, 2021, and is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Utilizing high-speed bullet trains, it connects Kunming in China and Laos’ capital Vientiane. 

In a Feb. 1, 2023, press release, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, praised the railway’s “role in facilitating cross-border transactions” benefiting “the people of both countries” while becoming “a popular international public [good] and a platform for international cooperation.” Xinhua’s claim, however, may be misleading because cross-border operations only started in April 2023 due to the pandemic-related restrictions of 2022. Thus, for a whole year, 80% of the railway’s traffic took place on the Chinese side of the border. 

Of the total project cost of US$6 billion, China covered 70% and provided technology, equipment, and operational expertise. The remaining 30% ($1.8 billion) was charged to Laos as loans. This amount is equivalent to 10% of Laos’ GDP. Nikkei Asia notes that the benefits for Laos from the project will take 22 years to recoup in a worst-case scenario and three years as a best case. The former seems more likely, given Laos’ foreign debt of $14.5 billion at the end of 2021, which exceeded its 2022 GDP. 

On top of a weakening currency, Laos’ total debts to China already comprise 65% of its GDP. Nikkei Asia reports that the ratio is considered “the highest in the world” and “raises concerns about a ‘debt trap’ that would leave Laos saddled with loans it cannot repay.”

World’s biggest trade bloc

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP), the world’s biggest trade bloc, came into effect in January 2022 and comprises the Asean member-economies, China, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Australia. While hailed by advocates of neoliberalism and free trade, RCEP has dire consequences for Southeast Asia. A study by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad) points to tariff revenue losses, damaged economic and financial capacity prospects, and worsened trade balances for Asean while benefiting mainly the trade bloc’s developed country-members. 

RCEP is also seen as injurious to developing countries’ industrial development, weakening regulatory mechanisms on social protection, telecommunications and financial services, and lacking in commitments on human rights, labor protection, and environmental standards. 

In the coming post-pandemic era, Southeast Asia is projected to transit from one peril to a host of new perils that would not be easy to manage, much less overcome. This development calls into question the popularly held notion of the region’s economies being the most dynamic in the world. 

This article is excerpted and revised from the author’s introduction “Post-pandemic Southeast Asia: Systemic perils and peoples’ alternatives” to a forthcoming publication, Re-Imagining Post-Pandemic Societies: Alternative Practices Across Southeast Asia: Volume II, of the UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies, Program on Alternative Development (UP CIDS AltDev). —Ed.

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Nikkei Asia observes that Southeast Asia remains “largely a fortress of authoritarianism, with military-based regimes (Thailand and Myanmar), dominant single parties (Vietnam, Singapore and Laos), absolute monarchies (Brunei) and old-fashioned autocrats (Cambodia) dominating the political landscape.” For the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, despite “a decent record of relatively competitive and free elections, . . . all three have also seen the emergence of authoritarian populist forces and the continued marginalization of progressive parties.”

There is no dearth of progressive social movements in Southeast Asia, but their effectiveness has been blunted by state repression and their diminished ability to mobilize the numbers needed to galvanize the region’s marginalized peoples into adopting more radical alternatives.

In Thailand and Myanmar, democratic movements led by young activists and students succeeded in bringing tens of thousands into the streets in protests against military power grabs. However, their efforts could not be sustained over a longer period.

Filipino political analyst Richard Heydarian, writing for Nikkei Asia, explains: “Absent a genuine revival of progressive forces, the region is likely at best to produce democratically elected populists and at worst, regress into full-fledged authoritarianism.”

Return to power

In the Philippines, the promise of the 1986 insurrection that toppled the Marcos dictatorship quickly dissipated with the ascendancy of corporate-driven neoliberal forces and the return of traditional dynastic politicians. Worse, the May 2022 elections saw the total return of the Marcoses to power, with the dictator’s son and namesake, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., easily winning the presidency.

Vera Files, the investigative journalism group, cited the Dahas Project data gathered by the Third World Studies Center of the University of the Philippines showing that:

In the first five months (July 1 to Nov. 30, 2022) of the Marcos Jr. administration, data showed 152 drug-related killings, already exceeding the 149 killings recorded during the final six months of the Duterte government (Jan. 1 to June 30, 2022).

Related: Southeast Asia’s dismal social conditions

Worst-case study

Myanmar is the worst-case study for Southeast Asian politics. Since staging a coup against the government of Aung San Suu Kyi in February 2021, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing’s regime has killed 2,940 people and jailed 13,763, according to human rights groups, while being totally oblivious to international condemnation. Japanese journalist Shigesaburo Okumura writes, however, that “other independent research and monitoring groups put civilian deaths at over 30,000, while hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people are believed to be cowering along remote borders.”

The Myanmar generals’ intransigence may be fueled by the fact that the United States, Japan, and the European Union continue to engage in lucrative trade deals with the junta, while Russia, China and India supply it with arms and other military hardware. These export deals amounted to “a record high of $3.3 billion between January and September 2022, or about 1.6 times more than the same period a year earlier.”

Western countries, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), confine themselves to ineffective calls for the junta to reinstall Aung Saan Suu Kyi or token gestures such as disinviting the generals to international gatherings while continuing to indulge authoritarian rulers of Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Singapore.

Major step backward

Indonesia has a taken a major step backward in the democratic agenda. In December 2022, bowing to pressure from Islamist parties and conservative movements, Joko Widodo’s government enacted a highly controversial criminal law, the Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP; Book of Criminal Law). This brings the government closer to the Southeast Asian authoritarian norm.

The new law limits the right to dissent; prohibits insulting the president, the vice-president, and government institutions; and criminalizes cohabitation, extramarital sex, and abortion. Human rights groups in Indonesia and abroad have denounced the new code as discriminating and oppressive against women, minorities, the LGBT community, and critics of the government.

Furthermore, Indonesian political scientist, Airlangga Pribadi Kusman notes that Article 188 of KUHP “states that any person who disseminates or promotes communism, Marxism or other understandings that violate Pancasila faces a fine or up to four years in prison.” Pancasila is Indonesia’s founding national ideology built on the five principles of national unity, humanism, democracy, social justice and belief in one god.

Military junta

Thailand continues to be ruled by a military junta camouflaged as a civilian government. After seizing power from an elected government in 2014, Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha unilaterally declared himself prime minister and then sought legitimacy by calling for elections in 2019. But after an anti-military party performed well, Prayuth had it dissolved, and its leader, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, was charged with lèse-majesté, an offense against the monarchy.

The new king, Maha Vajiralongkorn, is styling himself as an absolute monarch with the support of the military. Mass protests against military rule and the monarchy led by university students are routinely repressed, and their leaders incarcerated or disappeared.

Malaysia’s November 2022 general elections may herald a turning point away from authoritarianism, with former opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim finally assuming the post of prime minister. Social movements generally welcomed this change.

But the country has been stuck in a “middle income trap” due to “sluggish growth” stemming from weak fundamentals, low investments, setbacks in productivity, and “rampant corruption” under the previous Najib regime. Politically, however, Malaysia’s bumiputra policy favoring Malays and the growing strength of Islamist parties may prove to be formidable barriers to overcome.

To gain the premiership, Anwar had to enter into a coalition with the right-wing Barisan Nasional party long identified with one-party, semi-authoritarian politics. Reform advocates feel that Anwar is taking too long to institute urgent electoral and parliamentary changes. Anwar has disappointingly rejected repealing the oppressive University and University Colleges Act which had victimized him earlier.

Virtual monopoly

Singaporean politics has been virtually monopolized by the long-ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) and the Lee family since 1959. As Freedom House cites, “the electoral and legal framework that the PAP has constructed allows for some political pluralism, but it constrains the growth of credible opposition parties and limits freedoms of expression, assembly, and association.”

In recent years laws and regulations have been enacted that give government ministers the power to regulate online content, place legal pressure on independent online news sites, and redraw parliamentary constituencies to favor the PAP.

In Vietnam, a 2023 graduate thesis at the University of the Philippines by Ima Ariate recounts the government’s modernization plan implemented since 2000 of converting agricultural land to urban use. Euphemistically named “land recovery,” the program has resulted in land grabs that deprive peasant households of farmlands they have been ironically awarded under the country’s agrarian reform program.

One-party state

Laos is described by Freedom House as “a one-party state in which the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party dominates all aspects of politics and harshly restricts civil liberties.” No organized opposition exists; civil society groups are either restricted or coopted by government while domestic media is repressed. Land disputes are common, brought about by economic projects that tie the country to rising debt to China. A recurring case is the disappearance of prominent civil society leader Sombath Somphone who was abducted by police forces in 2012 and has not been seen since.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the region’s “freedom ratings” continue to deteriorate, as tracked by Freedom House (See table). Globally, freedom has taken a hit in 2022 with the world’s population living in “Free” countries registering a dramatic fall in 2019 from about 40% to 20%. In Southeast Asia, six countries were rated Not Free—Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. Four were rated Partly Free—Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore. Only Timor-Leste got a Free rating, despite barely making it to that category.

Press freedom has been deteriorating as well

In Singapore, “authorities forced one of the city-state’s few remaining independent news outlets to shut down by suspending its license.” Thai authorities “issued a broadly worded regulation to expand their ability to prosecute individuals for distributing news deemed to incite fear in the public.” In the Philippines, Nobel Prize laureate Maria Ressa, head of the independent news website Rappler, was constantly harassed, intimidated, and swamped with libel and other court cases by the Duterte administration. In addition, the franchise of the Philippines’ biggest media network, ABS-CBN, was not renewed.

In 2018, the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) ranked the Philippines as the “deadliest country for journalists in Southeast Asia and the worst offender in media impunity because of its high number of media killings.” Rappler notes that the 2009 Ampatuan massacre in the Philippines that killed 32 media workers stands historically as “the single deadliest attack on the media worldwide.”

Other Southeast Asian countries that ranked high in the IFJ’s “impunity scale” were Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Timor-Leste.

Meanwhile external trade and foreign investment flows into the 10 Asean member-countries continue to grow. Trade with non-Asean economies accounts for 79% of regional trade, while extra-region foreign investments take in an 81% share of the total.

For both investors and trading partners, Southeast Asia’s slide into authoritarian and non-democratic rule is obviously of no consequence.

This article is excerpted with revisions and additions from the author’s introduction “Post-pandemic Southeast Asia: Systemic perils and peoples’ alternatives” to a forthcoming publication, Towards a Peoples’ Alternative Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Volume II, of the UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies, Program on Alternative Development (UP CIDS AltDev).

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Most economies suffered recession, companies went bankrupt, supply chains were disrupted, major stock markets indices fell, unemployment rose, job vacancies dropped to an all-time low, and global tourism suffered downturns. Southeast Asian countries and economies were no exception to the pandemic impacts. The World Bank reported that all but one country (Vietnam) in the region suffered negative growth rates, with analysts seeing the region “being hit harder” economically than other parts of the globe.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) calculated that Covid-19 “pushed 4.7 million more people in Southeast Asia into extreme poverty and 9.3 million jobs disappeared.” The only businesses that prospered were the pharmaceutical corporations and other companies engaged in the manufacture and marketing of pandemic-related products. 

In early 2021, however, the Covid numbers appeared to be receding and stabilizing. Nevertheless, the World Health Organization (WHO) advised that countries can loosen restrictions and lift lockdowns only if they have “high immunity rates, their health care systems are strong and the epidemiological trends are going in the right direction.”  

But the easing may prove to be double-edged. While economies did recover in 2022, with the ADB estimating that Southeast Asia grew by 5.5% for the year, Covid infections and resulting deaths continued to rise. As Table One shows, total Southeast Asian Covid cases rose from 20 million to 36 million, or an average increase of 78 % in one year from Feb. 1, 2022, to Feb. 1, 2023.  

Southeast Asian countries with the highest rate increases in infections were Brunei (407%), Vietnam (269%), Singapore (226%), Thailand (68%),  Laos (53%) and Malaysia (50%). With the exception of Laos, these countries had been the region’s top performing economies for many years. Those with the lowest rate increases were Timor Leste (4%), Cambodia (7%), Myanmar (9%), and the Philippines (11%). 

The high rate of increases may be attributed to the early lifting of restrictions for Brunei (August 2020), Malaysia (August 2021), Vietnam (March 2022), Singapore (April 2022), Thailand (February 2022), and Laos (January 2022). The Philippines, on the other hand, with only an 11% increase in cases, declared a full lifting of restrictions as late as January this year. Surprisingly, Indonesia eased restrictions early on in the latter half of 2021 but had a lower rate of increase in infections at 17%. 

Deaths from the pandemic continued with the Southeast Asian fatality rate rising by 13 % in the one-year period between Feb. 1, 2022, and Feb 2, 2023, or from 323,401 to 365,541. The highest percentage increases in deaths were registered in Brunei (96%), Singapore (75%), and Thailand (46%). Countries with the lowest rate increases in deaths were Myanmar (0.7%), Cambodia (1%), Indonesia (9%) and Vietnam (8%). 

It must be pointed out, however, that these figures may be underestimated or under-reported. This would be true for countries with underdeveloped health systems—i.e., inadequate mass testing and contact tracing capabilities—which could apply to most of Southeast Asia. 

As far as vaccinations go, Southeast Asia’s record remains uneven (see Table 2). As of Feb. 1, 2023, the average percentage of persons fully vaccinated—i.e., two doses—of the region’s total population remains a low 68%. But five countries—Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam—had high vaccination rates ranging from 81% to 97% as of Feb. 1, 2023. These numbers fall within the threshold range to achieve “herd immunity,” which experts calculate to be from 80% to 90% vaccination for the Covid-19 virus at the height of the Delta variant infections. 

For those with the required booster shots, the number drastically falls to a low 31% for Southeast Asia as a whole.  Only Singapore, (with 84%) has achieved the numbers required for herd immunity. In terms of vaccination doses per 100 population, the Southeast Asian average of 210 means that, in general, each person has had only two vaccine doses, instead of the mandated four. 

The Southeast Asian rate of vaccinations situate the region between the two poles that illustrate the disparities between rich and poor countries that is reflected on a global scale. An Oxford University team calculated that, at the extreme levels “as of Nov. 6, 2022, about 80% of people in high-income countries had received at least one vaccine dose compared to only 23% of those in low-income countries.”  The inequalities become harsher in the case of those fully vaccinated (75% vs. 19%) and those with booster jabs (61% vs. 1.4%).

Access to affordable vaccines by poor and developing countries is crucial to strengthen efforts at curbing the pandemic. This need, however, is hamstrung by continuing refusals of developed countries and multinational pharmaceutical corporations to widen access to Covid-19 tests, vaccines, and treatment. In early December 2022 the United States, the European Union and wealthy Asian nations (Japan and South Korea) successfully delayed a decision on a proposal by developing member-countries to waive intellectual property rights held by multinationals on therapies and tests related to Covid-19. 

On Jan. 30, 2023, the WHO declared that “Covid-19 continues to constitute a public health emergency of international concern, its highest form of alert,” and added that the viral disease “was likely in a ‘transition period’ that continues to need careful management to mitigate the potential negative consequences.”  

This article is excerpted with revisions and additions from the author’s introduction “What holds for a post-pandemic Southeast Asia?” to a forthcoming publication, Towards a Peoples’ Alternative Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Volume II, published by the UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies, Program on Alternative Development (UP CIDS AltDev). —Ed.

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For governments in the region, tourism is a major contributor to economic growth; the Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that it contributes “at least 15% to 25% of each country’s GDP (gross domestic product)” and employs 40 million employees. The industry experienced major downturns at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, with arrivals plunging precipitously, but with the easing of restrictions and the opening of borders, visitors have begun flocking back to the region. 

The ADB sees the revival of Southeast Asia’s tourism industry as “an opportunity to fix structural issues that have plagued tourism over the years and rebuild it greener … ” given that “across the region, there are numerous examples of rapid tourism growth harming the environment.” In the Philippines, the famous Boracay suffered from “overtourism” and lax sanitation measures, causing sewer and waste management to deteriorate. This led to the closure of the island to tourists for six months in 2018 to undergo environmental rehabilitation and renewal. 

Notoriety

There is, of course, the practice of “sex tourism” for which Southeast Asia has become notorious. The International Association for Medical Assistance to Travelers defines sex tourism as “travel specifically arranged for or planned by travelers to facilitate the procurement of sex.” A recent survey of the top 10 sex tourism destinations in the world includes Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia. The United Nations’ International Labor Organization notes that “in Indonesia alone, the sex work industry accounts for between 0.8 and 2.4 percent of the country’s GDP estimated at US$1.2 billion.”

The buzzword being promoted by both the ADB and the UN World Tourism Organization is “sustainable travel”—i.e., “tourism that takes full account of its current and future economic, social, and environmental impacts, addressing the needs of visitors, the industry, the environment, and host communities.” It is also to make sure that “tourist dollars that come in benefit the community and the local economy.”  

Sustainable tourism is one of the targets under the UN Sustainable Development Goal No. 8—i.e., to “promote sustained and inclusive economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.”

The question, however, is whether Southeast Asian governments will buy into the UN and ADB proposals “to counter excessive tourism.” Nikkei Asia reported in 2022 that the measures mulled, such as “charging higher admission fees, limiting visitor numbers, and temporary closures of vulnerable areas like national parks and marine sanctuaries,” have been met with a “barrage of opposition from the tourist industry and local government officials.” 

Related: Tourism chief cites world’s 1st green travel mart for authentic ecotourism

‘Myanmar’s Silicon Valley’

A portent of things to come may already be gleaned from a Nikkei Asia special report that in Myanmar’s Karen (Kayin) state along the Moei River that divides Thailand from Myanmar, a fantastic $15-billion “city of the future” called Shwe Kokko Yatai New City is being built. 

The project in Myanmar’s insurgency-torn state was promoted as part of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative.” It was, however, disavowed by the Chinese embassy and questioned by the former government of Aung San Suu Kyi. After the military coup on Feb 1, 2021, that overthrew Suu Kyi, the project proceeded as planned. 

Shwe Kokko is being billed as “Myanmar’s Silicon Valley” but the real picture is menacing and sinister, as the Nikkei Asia report uncovered. Lying just north of Thailand’s Mae Sot province, the high-tech site is actually “a known criminal hub used for online gambling, scamming and human trafficking,” and the structures look more like “penal colonies” with 4-meter concrete walls topped with coiled razor wire … resembling concentration camps.” 

Its Chinese financier-operators with underworld reputations have fled Macao’s now highly regulated gambling and illicit businesses.  As if on cue, “more crime zones [are] springing up southward along the shallow, winding Moei River, which at the driest times of year can be crossed on foot.” 

The shift to Southeast Asian locations by gambling lords and sex traffickers was precipitated by “Covid-19 lockdowns and official clampdowns on casino junkets” in Macao, which reduced gambling revenues in 2021 to the lowest level ever. Macao casino financiers have actually been moving out since 2016 to less regulated territories such as Sihanoukville and Poipet in Cambodia, and later in Thailand’s borders with Laos and Myanmar. 

This exodus has created countless unregulated casinos beyond any rule of law. Masquerading as “special economic zones,” the new criminal enclaves now occupy a stretch of 40 kilometers along the Moei River. Furthermore, online gambling technology and infrastructure have also been used for scamming, causing a regional “scamdemic,” to use Nikkei Asia’s term. 

The “development” frenzy has gotten out of control, prompting the US Institute of Peace to dub in a commentary “15 distinct criminal zones in the area” as “a growing threat to global security.” 

Tourism hub

Meanwhile, the ADB has launched a Southeast Asia Tourism Hub to “help member countries develop and structure projects that are bankable for the private sector and help governments develop and design suitable projects.” One major goal is to raise the capital via private investments to finance sustainable tourism projects in the region following the public-private partnership (PPP) model.

There is, however, an element of hypocrisy in the ADB’s promotion of  “green tourism” given that the bank has been providing billions of dollars in support of mega projects such as dams and mining concerns that have been anything but protective of the environment.

In any case, Southeast Asian governments may be slow to respond to or could be resistant to the ADB’s initiatives. PPPs have had a spotty record in the region and elsewhere, aside from having a long gestation period of implementation. That being the case, quick-return tourism-related projects like the Shwe Kokko zones along the Moei River may prove to be more attractive to private capital anxious to recoup its heavy losses during the pandemic. 

This article is excerpted with revisions and additions from the author’s introduction “What holds for a post-pandemic Southeast Asia?” to a forthcoming publication, Towards a Peoples’ Alternative Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Volume II, published by the UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies, Program on Alternative Development (UP CIDS AltDev). —Ed.

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